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FOR MORE THAN fifty years the doctrine of "industrial plu-
ralism" has provided a principal, and perhaps the dominant,
theoretical basis for labor relations in the United States.' The con-
cept was broadly and pervasively applied and tested by the Na-
tional War Labor Board (NWLB) through formulation and ad-
ministration of its World War II labor relations policy. 2
Strongly influenced by University of Wisconsin economics
Professor John R. Commons and his student William M. Leiser-
son,3 industrial pluralism rejects the inevitability of labor/capital
strife. The theory instead posits a virtually mystical faith in col-
lective bargaining as a labor relations problem solving device and
treats the collective bargaining contract as the constitution of the
private sector work place. This constitution provides governance in
matters affecting wages, hours, and terms and conditions of em-
ployment,' while preserving a proper sphere for management
rights.5 The theory deems a contractual grievance procedure
capped by arbitration as an extension of collective bargaining,'
* B.S. (1935); L.L.B. (1938); A.M., Ohio State University (1940); L.L.D., Suffolk
University (1985); Disputes Director, Region V, NWLB, 1943-45; Vice-chairman Ship-
building Commission, NWLB 1945; Chairman Region VII, NWLB, 1945-46; Judge, 8th
District Court of Appeals, Ohio, 1968-84; Arbitrator; Chairman, Ohio State Employment
Relations Board, 1984-88.
1. C. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS, LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE
ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960, at xi-xii (1985).
2. The NWLB was established January 12, 1942 by Exec. Order No. 9017, 3 C.F.R.
1075 (1938-1943).
3. Arbitrator; Professor of Economics, Antioch College; Chairman, National Media-
tion Board; Member, National Labor Relations Board. This is only a sampling of the many
and varied academic and official positions related to labor relations occupied by Professor
Leiserson. He may have been the single most influential labor relations theorist in the 20th
Century.
4. See C. ToMLINS, supra note 1, at 74-82.
5. Id. at 79-80 (discussing Leiserson's views on management rights); see also Teller,
The War Labor Board and Management Functions, 21 N.Y.U. L. REV. 319 (1946); cf.
Williams, Note on Management Prerogatives, in 2 THE TERMINATION REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD 623-24 (1949).
6.
Collective bargaining is not confined to the making of an agreement once a year.
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generally enabling the parties in conference to interpret and apply
the contract and settle issues between themselves. The premise is
that problem solving can be effectively accomplished only on an
informed, practical basis, and that result is most likely to be
achieved by the parties because, presumably, they are in the best
position to understand the issues.7 By implication, there is an ad-
monition to settle at "home" and to avoid courts and lawyers.
The controlling philosophy at the NWLB epitomized indus-
trial pluralism. Collective bargaining and the constitutive con-
tract, including a grievance procedure, were the heart of the mat-
ter.8 Voluntaryism was the consistent theme,9 democratic process
It is also a day-to-day process and, on this score, the grievance procedure plays a
highly important role. The grievance procedure should be set up so as to make °
unnecessary unresolved disputes over the application of the agreement.
Statement of NWLB vice-chairman Dr. George W. Taylor in Chrysler Corp., 10 War Lab.
Rep. 551, 554 (Aug. 27, 1943).
7. See 1 THE TERMINATION REPORT OF THE NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD 65-66
(1949).
The experience of the National War Labor Board in the administration of the
no-strike no-lockout agreement has shown conclusively that proper grievance
procedures under collective bargaining agreements have:
I. Prevented abuse of the no-strike no-lockout agreement.
2. Removed obstacles to high morale and maximum production.
3. Preserved collective bargaining as a basic democractic institution in the
total war effort.
These fundamental American values and aids to the successful prosecution of
the war can be attained by grievance procedures which provide:
1. That prompt initial attention be given to the grievance by those in the
plant who have intimate knowledge of the dispute. The exact steps and proce-
dures for such attention to grievances must be adapted to/the needs of the plant
and can be best worked out by the parties themselves.
2. That the grievance procedure, whatever be its adaptation to the needs
of the plant, should provide for the final and binding settlement of all grievances
not otherwise resolved. For this purpose, provision should be made for the settle-
ment of grievances by an arbitrator, impartial chairman or umpire under terms
and conditions agreed to by the parties.
Therefore, the National War Labor Board, as the custodian of the no-strike no-
lockout agreement, and as a part of the all-out effort to win the war, calls upon
the parties to all labor agreements to accept this urgent responsibility and render
this patriotic service.
I. To install adequate procedures for the prompt, just, and final settlement
of the day-to-day grievances involving the interpretation and application of the
contract.
2. To make the full functioning of the grievance procedure a major re-
sponsibility under the no-strike no-lockout agreement for maximum production
to win the war.
Id.
8. Id.
9. See Taylor, Voluntaryism, Tripartism and Wage Stabilization, in 1 THE TERMI-
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the avowed method.10 It is not without significance that among the
principal architects of NWLB structure and policy were William
H. Davis," George W. Taylor, 2 Lloyd K. Garrison,' 3 and Edwin
E. Witte."4 They were all pluralists whether they specifically
ascribed their labor relations approach to pluralist tenets or not.15
Certainly not all employers have agreed with the pluralist
dogma, and, just as certainly, a sizable segment may reasonably
be said to have strongly disagreed with it before, during, and after
World War II. However, war imposed a consensus. When labor/
capital took the "no strike/no lockout" pledge early in the war
and agreed to substitute peaceful adjudication for economic power
confrontations, the NWLB came into being. 6
One of the Board's virtues was the provision for a relatively
serene procedure for resolving those basic contract issues which
the parties could not bargain out. Executive Order 9017 gave the
NWLB broad authority to "finally determine the dispute, and for
this purpose . . . use mediation, voluntary arbitration, or arbitra-
NATION REPORT OF THE NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD XV-XXi (1949)(the voluntary no-
strike no-lockout pledge served as the groundwork of the national war-time labor policy).
10.
The task of settling labor disputes in wartime was entrusted to a Board of twelve
men, four representing the public, four industry, and four labor. The idea was
simple. The vexing problems of labor relations can best be met by threshing out
conflicting points of view and by reconciling them as far as possible around the
conference table. The issues would, in any event, be finally resolved by majority
vote of the Board. Let me emphasize that in the War Labor Board representa-
tives of labor and of industry participate in all cases and each has an equal vote
with the public representatives in finally determining cases. The democratic pro-
cess is the solid rock upon which the National War Labor Board has been built.
Address by Dr. George W. Taylor, Vice Chairman of the NWLB at Swarthmore College,
Swarthmore, Pennsylvania (December 6, 1942), reprinted in 2 THE TERMINATION REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD 502 (1949)(emphasis added).
11. Chairman, NDMB, First Chairman, NWLB.
12. Professor of Economics, University of Pennsylvania; Arbitrator; Vice-Chairman,
NWLB; Second Chairman, NWLB.
13. Dean, University of Wisconsin Law School; Public Member, NWLB; Vice-
Chairman, NWLB; Third and last Chairman, NWLB.
14. Chairman, Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin; Chairman, De-
troit Regional War Labor Board XI; Public Member, NWLB.
15. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text for a demonstration of the philo-
sophical debt.
16. The experiences of the National Defense Mediation Board (NDMB) contributed
materially to developing policies fundamental to the accomplishments of its successor the
National War Labor Board. See Davis, The Influence of the National Defense Mediation
Board's Experience on the National War Labor Board, I THE TERMINATION REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD xii-xv (1949).
1988-89]
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tion under rules established by the Board."1 Necessity, however,
perhaps even more than pluralist convention, stimulated NWLB
use of its grievance/arbitration authority. For it has been esti-
mated that there were hundreds of thousands of negotiations dur-
ing the War resulting in collective bargaining contracts.18 Clearly,
without private grievance processes to settle minor but important
adjustments in contracts of this quantity, the NWLB dispute sys-
tem would have been inundated. Thus, necessity was at least one
parent of the policy supporting private grievance procedure settle-
ments. In addition, grievance procedure capped by arbitration was
frequently ordered into contracts whose terms the Board was
called upon to settle in disputes cases.' 9 While the NWLB cer-
tainly did not invent grievance procedures and arbitration, it
powerfully stimulated the spread of both.
Most of the prime actors in NWLB history are dead. Thus,
the number of persons still available and qualified by direct
knowledge to discuss the policy considerations and implementing
decisions which accounted for the proliferation of grievance/arbi-
tration under NWLB auspices is probably not greater than ten.
Professor Aaron, Mr. Gill, and Mr. Garrett are three of that
small group. In that order they will discuss the origins of NWLB
policy on grievance procedure and arbitration.
17. Exec. Order No. 9017, 3 C.F.R. 1075 (1938-1943).
18. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN 1009,
PROBLEMS AND POLICIES OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND WAGE STABILIZATION DURING
WORLD WAR I, at 53 n.36 (1952).
19. See supra note 7.
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